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ABSTRACT Theories have been developed in the disclosure literature to explain the reasons behind 
the decision to disclose more information. Empirical evidence does not consistently support disclosure 
theories and results found are contradictory. The diffi culty in measuring voluntary disclosure might 
be one of the reasons infl uencing on these divergences. In this paper, we investigate two key ques-
tions related to disclosure measurement. First, we aim to empirically test if use of disclosure indices 
that measure different information attributes determines validity of disclosure theories. Second, we 
investigate how disclosure indices design infl uences results. Results show that determinants of more 
specifi c information attributes are different than those that infl uence less specifi c attributes. Fur-
thermore, independently of the information attribute that is measured, disclosure measure design 
infl uences results. 
KEY WORDS Disclosure indices; Disclosure determinants; Forward-looking information; Disclosure 
theories.
RESUMEN En la literatura sobre divulgación de información se han desarrollado diversas teorías 
para explicar los motivos que llevan a las empresas a divulgar más información. La evidencia em-
pírica no apoya consistentemente las teorías y los resultados encontrados son contradictorios. Estas 
divergencias podrían estar ocasionadas por problemas implícitos a la medición de la información 
voluntaria. En este trabajo, se estudian dos cuestiones clave relacionadas con este problema. Pri-
meramente, investigamos si el uso de índices de revelación que captan diferentes atributos infor-
mativos determina la validez de las teorías enunciadas sobre la divulgación de información. Por 
otro lado, analizamos la infl uencia de utilizar distintas medidas de la información. Los resultados 
muestran que los determinantes de atributos informativos más específi cos son distintos de aquellos 
factores que infl uyen en la divulgación de atributos menos específi cos. Además, independiente-
mente del atributo informativo que es medido, el diseño de un índice de revelación infl uye en los 
resultados obtenidos.
PALABRAS CLAVE Divulgación de información; Determinantes de la divulgación; Información previ-
sional; Teorías sobre divulgación.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Various theories have been developed in the disclosure literature to explain the reasons be-
hind the decision to disclose more and/or better information. Empirical tests of disclosure 
theories identify which characteristics of the companies determine disclosure (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 1995; Giner, 1997; Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003; Prencipe, 2004). Although the methodologies applied are similar, not 
only do the results lack consistency in their support of disclosure theories but they are also 
often contradictory (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Chavent et al., 2006). One possible expla-
nation for these contradictory results lies in the diffi culty inherent to the measurement of 
information disclosure. The diffi culty in measuring voluntary disclosure is one of the most 
important problems encountered by empirical researchers in disclosure studies (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). In this paper, we tackle this problem by investigating two key questions 
related to disclosure measurement. To the best of our knowledge, these questions remain 
unchallenged in the literature on disclosure determinants. 
First, we aim to empirically test which determinants are related to which specifi c infor-
mation attributes. In other words, we want to test how using disclosure indices that mea-
sure different information attributes affect the signifi cance of some of the determinants 
proposed by disclosure theories. With this purpose in mind, we compare results obtained 
when using various disclosure indices that measure different information attributes in a 
regression analysis of disclosure determinants. The information attributes considered are 
quantity, coverage and quality. 
Second, we study how disclosure index design infl uences the results of empirical analysis 
of disclosure theories. To this end, we compare two disclosure indices that capture the 
same information attribute, but which are designed in a different way. 
Our empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of listed Spanish companies and focuses 
on the disclosure of forward-looking information. We fi nd that size is the only determinant 
that signifi cantly affects all the disclosure attributes considered. The signifi cance of other 
determinants depends on the attributes of disclosure which are measured by the specifi c 
index adopted. Moreover, we will show that, even when we focus on a specifi c attribute of 
disclosure, the design of the index used for the measurement of that attribute affects the 
results of the analysis.
Disclosure theories do not generally provide an exhaustive defi nition of the term «disclosu-
re». Theories assume that, under specifi c circumstances, companies disclose more informa-
tion because perceived expected benefi ts exceed costs. However, the theoretical arguments 
are enunciated in a generic way and fail to explicitly defi ne what exactly is meant by «more 
information» or «an increase in disclosure». Disclosure is a multidimensional concept that 
integrates various attributes (Beattie et al., 2004). Consequently, it is expected that the 
determinants of disclosure of specifi c information attributes will be different to those of 
other attributes. For instance, the factors that infl uence disclosure quantity can differ from 
the determinants of information quality. We test whether the use of disclosure measures 
that capture different information attributes results in empirical evidence showing that the 
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disclosure determinants also differ. Disclosure indices that capture dissimilar information 
attributes —such as quantity, coverage or quality— coexist in the literature (Entwistle, 
1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Wallace et al., 1994; Giner, 1997; Prencipe, 2004; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). We expect that the general theoretical 
arguments will be verifi ed when less specifi c disclosure measures are used (e.g.: quantity 
or coverage). However, the theoretical predictions on disclosure determinants may lack full 
verifi cation when more specifi c measures (such as information richness or depth) are em-
ployed. This being the case, then the implications for research on disclosure determinants 
are substantial. It would highlight the need to enunciate theories on disclosure determi-
nants more explicitly, by taking information attributes into consideration. In the same way, 
disclosure indices should be designed on the basis of specifi c information characteristics, 
in order to obtain empirical results of a more conclusive nature. 
Disclosure index design is a complex task, affected by subjectivity. Several diffi culties have 
to be faced when building a disclosure index, such as item selection and weighting (García-
Meca and Martínez, 2004). As Ahmed and Courtis (1999) suggest, the use of diverse disclo-
sure measures is one possible explanation for the contradictory results found in empirical 
research on disclosure determinants. Self-constructed indices that capture coverage are 
the most commonly used measures. A common approach in this kind of study is to design 
an index that captures coverage of several informational items and to relate it to several 
company characteristics. Despite the controversial nature of this methodology, as far as we 
know there are no studies about the impact of different index designs on the results in this 
research area. Empirical evidence on this matter will highlight the need for the specifi c dis-
closure measure to be considered when interpreting results, and more importantly, when 
comparing these results with those in the prior literature. 
This research contributes towards our understanding of the disclosure measurement and 
of the research on disclosure determinants. It sheds some light on the reasons why contra-
dictory results on voluntary disclosure determinants have been documented. «Disclosure» 
as a concept is still not clearly defi ned in terms of specifi c information attributes. This lack 
of consensus on the disclosure index design may explain divergences in the results. The 
implications for future research include the necessity to be more precise about information 
attributes when developing theoretical hypotheses and the need to search for more clearly 
defi ned disclosure measures that provide comparable results. 
This paper is organized as follows. The literature regarding disclosure theories and dis-
closure indices is reviewed in the next section. Section 3 describes data collection and the 
sample, whereas Section 4 explains the research method. Section 5 discusses the results of 
the empirical analysis and Section 6 summarizes the contributions of the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Disclosure of fi nancial information is an area that has triggered a great deal of academic 
interest in recent years. Among other topics, research is focused on the corporate characte-
ristics that help to predict a fi rm’s disclosure level. Even though similar methodologies and 
corporate characteristics have been used in the prior research on disclosure determinants, 
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some disagreements have appeared in relation to some of these characteristics (Chavent 
et al., 2006). In some cases, results fail to support theoretical arguments; in others, results, 
from empirical studies that are designed in a similar fashion, differ (Cooke, 1989; Raffour-
nier, 1995; Prencipe, 2004). These contradictory results suggest the existence of some open 
questions in this research area. 
One of the most important drawbacks encountered by researchers has to do with the pro-
blems that are inherent to the measurement of voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). We hypothesize that there are two main factors that might be causing these contra-
dictory results: fi rst, disclosure theories use a concept of disclosure that is not specifi cally 
defi ned in terms of information attributes; second, different disclosure measures are em-
ployed in each of the empirical studies. In this section, both the literature about disclosure 
theories and the literature on disclosure measure design are reviewed.
2.1. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE THEORIES
The determinants of voluntary disclosure have been subjected to major analysis. Several 
theories explain the reasons for companies to reveal voluntary information (under the 
assumption that fi rms perceive benefi ts from disclosure), including agency theory, signa-
lling theory and political process theory, among others. Proprietary costs as well as costs 
derived from the collection and preparation of information must also be considered from a 
theoretical perspective (Prencipe, 2004). To a lesser extent, other types of costs have been 
found as limitations to the disclosure of information, such as corporate governance and 
monitoring, capital needs, litigation costs, and audit fi rm reputation (Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999). The theoretical arguments on the determinants of voluntary information disclosure 
are summarized below. 
Agency theory defi nes an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more per-
sons (principals) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and Mec-
kling, 1976). It is expected that the agent will not always act in the best interest of the prin-
cipal. Agency theory claims that confl icts are expected to arise when there is incomplete 
and asymmetric information between principal and agent in a company. Both parties may 
have different interests and this problem could be minimized by providing more informa-
tion. Some determinants of voluntary information that have been commonly associated to 
the agency problem are size, leverage, profi tability and listing status.
First, given that larger fi rms carry out a greater number of contracts which are more com-
plex than smaller fi rms, agency costs depend on company size (Rodríguez Perez, 2004). 
Larger fi rms are expected to reveal more voluntary information to reduce these costs. 
Second, agency costs are higher when the proportion of debt increases. Agency theory 
predicts that a highly leveraged company has more of an obligation to satisfy the informa-
tion needs of long-term and short-term creditors, and hence it may provide more detail 
to meet those needs than would a less leveraged fi rm (García-Meca et al., 2005). Third, 
higher margin and higher profi tability lead to a greater level of disclosure in order to ob-
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tain and justify better contractual conditions. Managers will disclose detailed information 
to improve their compensation arrangements (Giner, 1997). Finally, listed companies are 
expected to provide more information due to the higher information requirements they 
face, or due to agency costs (Giner, 1995). Specifi cally, international listing status is also 
expected to infl uence disclosure. Disclosure serves to control the agency costs that appear 
when ownership is more disperse (García-Meca et al., 2005).
Signalling theory indicates that asymmetric information between a company and the in-
vestors causes adverse selection. To avoid this situation, companies disclose information 
voluntarily, providing signals to the market (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Size, profi tabi-
lity and growth are factors that infl uence the decision to disclose voluntary information to 
avoid adverse selection.
Information asymmetries will be larger for big companies, which justify more disclosure 
for mitigation purposes (Rodríguez Pérez, 2004). Moreover, fi rms with a high profi tability 
will have a higher tendency to disclose more information to the markets, to increase in-
vestor confi dence (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) and prevent undervaluation of their shares 
(Giner, 1997). Finally, growth and disclosure are expected to be positively related (Lev and 
Penman, 1990) since companies with high growth rates provide more information to be 
more attractive in the market.
Political process theory suggests that regulators make decisions based on the information 
disclosed by fi rms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Companies disclose voluntary informa-
tion to minimize these political costs. Size and profi tability are incentives for companies to 
reveal more information to reduce these costs. Larger fi rms are subject to higher political 
costs, leading to a greater level of disclosure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Higher infor-
mation disclosure is expected to justify a fi rm’s large profi ts and thus avoid legal obliga-
tions (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) and as a justifi cation of the company’s profi t level (Giner, 
1997). Political costs and the competitive environment also infl uence the level of informa-
tion disclosed in an industry (Mora and Rees, 1996).
In addition, proprietary costs are considered as one of the most important limitations to 
information disclosure. Competitive disadvantages infl uence the decision to provide priva-
te information. Smaller fi rms are sensitive, to a great extent, to the disadvantages that, in 
terms of competitive edge, are derived from a higher disclosure level (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Giner, 1995). The previous literature has also considered the costs derived from the 
collection and preparation of information as an obstacle to revealing more voluntary infor-
mation. Company size plays an important role to minimize these costs, which decrease for 
larger fi rms (Land and Lundholm, 1993).
In summary, under the framework of these theories, the prior research has employed 
variables, such as size, leverage, profi tability, growth and listing status as determinants 
of voluntary information disclosure. However, theories refer to information disclosure in 
general terms, while this concept embodies several attributes or dimensions. The reasons 
to increase or improve the disclosure of a specifi c information attribute might be different 
to the rationale for enhancing another attribute. Disclosure indices that capture different 
information attributes concur in the literature. Our objective is to test whether the deter-
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minants of a specifi c information attribute disclosure differ from those of other attributes. 
This being the case, existing disclosure theories will not remain applicable in all cases. 
2.2. MEASUREMENT OF DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure is measured in the prior research by following various approaches, all under 
the implicit assumption that disclosure quality is what is being measured (Beattie et al., 
2004). One approach is the use of scores provided by analysts according to the amount of 
information disclosed-such as scores elaborated by the Association for Investment Mana-
gement and Research [AIMR (1)], and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). However, it has been argued 
that they are biased owing to analysts’ subjectivity or the number of companies that com-
pose the AIMR or S&P samples (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Another approach is the use of 
self-constructed indices. This approach is the most frequently employed due to the need 
for disclosure measures that are valid regardless of the companies selected or the kind of 
information analysed. 
Self-constructed indices commonly measure voluntary information in general (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Raffournier, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 2000), or mandatory in-
formation (Wallace and Naser, 1995, Chen and Jaggi, 2000). However, some studies have 
employed disclosure indices to measure specifi c information, like intellectual capital (Cer-
bioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008), environmental and social (Williams, 1999) or 
forward-looking information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2005; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007).
As mentioned in previous sections, diverse information attributes are considered when 
designing self-constructed measures. Some disclosure indices are based on information 
quantity (Entwistle, 1999; Williams, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007; Li et al., 2008). Measures of a more specifi c and complex nature have recently been 
developed, including several dimensions related to information richness (Beretta and Boz-
zolan, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the majority of studies employ indices that capture coverage of several in-
formation categories. Although most of disclosure indices do not assign any weight to the 
information items (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995; Giner, 
1997; Depoers, 2000), some of them select weighted items (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buz-
by, 1975; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Several indices have also considered information 
specifi city to obtain a proxy for information scope by assigning a higher value to quantita-
tive information (Botosan, 1997; Robb et al., 2001). 
Despite the proliferation of information indices of similar design, the results from research 
on disclosure determinants are contradictory. Most of the studies agree on the existence of 
a positive relationship between size and disclosure, indicating that larger companies disclo-
se more information (Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989; Wallace 
et al., 1994; Giner, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2005). However, other studies show no 
evidence on this relationship (Malone et al., 1993; Ahmed, 1996, Prencipe, 2004). Disagre-
ements are also found in studies on forward-looking information; some research fi nds a 
 (1) As of 9 May 2004, AIMR changed its name to CFA institute.
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signifi cant relationship (Kent and Ung, 2003; Hossain et al., 2005), whereas other studies 
do not support this result (García and Monterrey, 1993; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007).
Other widely studied factors, such as profi tability, leverage, auditor or industry, show mo-
re contradictory results. There is no consensus in previous research on how profi tability 
infl uences disclosure. Giner (1997) documents a positive relationship, while some others 
do not (McNally et al., 1982; Raffournier, 1995; Prencipe, 2004). A negative association 
between profi tability and disclosure level has also been documented (Wallace et al., 1994). 
Research on forward-looking information disclosure also shows mixed results (Hossain 
et al., 2005; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007).
The results from research on leverage and disclosure are also confusing: some authors fi nd 
a signifi cant relationship (Mora and Rees, 1996), others fi nd no evidence (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Wallace et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995, among others). Studies on forward-
looking information disclosure fi nd both a signifi cant relationship (Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007) and no evidence about this variable (Kent and Ung, 2003). Some research fi nds 
a positive relationship between auditor fi rm and disclosure (Ahmed, 1996; Giner, 1997). 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence is mixed, since other fi ndings support no such positive 
relationship (Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Wallace et al., 1994). Regarding industry, 
whereas some studies show a positive relationship between industry and voluntary disclo-
sure (Cooke, 1992), others do not (McNally et al., 1982; Meek et al., 1995). Mixed results 
are also found in forward-looking information studies (García and Monterrey, 1993; Aljifri 
and Hussainey, 2007).
Above all, a major diffi culty faced by researchers in this area is the measurement of dis-
closure. Although all diverse information attributes should be taken into account to make 
up a comprehensive disclosure measure, existing disclosure indices generally concentrate 
on coverage. Moreover, there are no general guidelines for the design of an index, which 
is usually constructed by the researchers themselves to meet specifi c research needs. As 
pointed out earlier, the results of prior research are contradictory and hardly comparable. 
In an attempt to offer some explanation, we study the use of disclosure indices that are 
designed to capture similar information attributes and their effects on empirical results.
3. SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample is composed of the listed companies that make up the Spanish IBEX 35 stock 
market index during the period 2000-2004. Listed and larger fi rms are more likely to pro-
vide voluntary information, which benefi ts further analysis. For a company to be included 
in the sample, it had to be one of the companies appearing in the index in at least one of 
those years. Over that period, 36 companies belonged at least once to the set of companies 
that make up the stock market index. We excluded fi nancial companies due to the fact that 
their special characteristics could bias the results. The information was gathered for the 
years: 2002, 2003 and 2004. The fi nal sample included 36 companies; therefore there are 
108 fi rm-year observations. 
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4. RESEARCH METHOD
We test whether the theories on disclosure determinants are applicable when specifi c in-
formation attributes are considered. Several disclosure measures capturing different in-
formation attributes are compared in an empirical investigation of voluntary disclosure 
determinants. The factors causing disclosure in terms of a specifi c information attribute 
may differ from the reasons that determine another attribute. To this end, we compare 
disclosure indices that measure information quantity, coverage and quality. In addition, 
we compare two disclosure indices that capture coverage —but which are designed diffe-
rently— to study if the disclosure measure design determines the results obtained. 
The information disclosed by companies was coded according to specifi c criteria that had 
been previously established when designing the indices (see Section 4.1.). The sources of 
information examined were the annual reports. Previous research indicates that annual re-
ports provide a good proxy for the level of information disclosed by a company (Botosan, 
1997) and that the information contained in annual reports is positively correlated with the 
information provided in other sources (Land and Lundholm, 1993). The code unit chosen 
was the sentence, since using sentences for both coding and measurement seems likely to 
provide complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
The information analysed was the forward-looking information disclosed in the annual re-
port. We focused on only one kind of information since otherwise, coding every sentence in 
each of the annual reports in the sample would imply an endless task. Forward-looking in-
formation was chosen due to its relevance for external users. As Kieso and Weygant (1986) 
indicate, forward-looking information disclosure is benefi cial for several reasons: since his-
torical information is insuffi cient for appropriate decision making, then information risk 
would reduce, thereby improving investment decisions and future cash-fl ows estimation. 
Moreover, forward-looking information is included in most of the corporate disclosure fra-
meworks. The usefulness of forward-looking fi nancial information for investors has been 
pointed out in several reports such as the Trueblood Report (AICPA, 1973) and the Corpo-
rate Report (ICAEW, 1975), and more recently by the FASB (2001) report titled Improving 
Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosure, and by the ICAEW (2002) 
report titled Prospective Financial Information: Guidance for UK Directors, and by the CICA 
(2002) report titled Management’s discussion and analysis; Guidance on preparation and 
disclosure. Finally, we decided to analyze forward-looking information thanks to the availa-
bility of a more complex measure that captures different dimensions specifi cally related to 
forward-looking information disclosure quality (designed by Beretta and Bozzolan, 2005).
The coding process started with the execution of a preliminary test so as to set up several 
coding rules. Two annual reports (excluded from the sample) were examined indepen-
dently by two different researchers, with the purpose of identifying possible disagreements 
and of measuring reliability. The whole sample (108 annual reports) was then coded ac-
cording to the criteria established when designing each index. At the end of the process, a 
reliability test was performed by employing the alpha agreement coeffi cient proposed by 
Krippendorf (1980). Once the whole sample was coded and the robustness of this process 
was verifi ed, an empirical analysis was performed through a regression analysis which 
examined forward-looking information determinants.
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4.1. DESIGN OF THE INDICES
We compare several indices that capture different information attributes. Disclosure de-
terminants may differ depending on the information attribute that is being considered. 
Traditional disclosure theories are satisfi ed when the term «higher disclosure» is defi ned 
in general terms, but might not be satisfi ed if more complex information attributes are 
considered. Theories are expected to be satisfi ed when measuring information quantity. 
However, companies perceive higher costs when providing more specifi c information, and 
the determinants of attributes related to information richness might not agree with existing 
disclosure theories. 
To this end, we use three indices that differ on the specifi city of the information attributes 
captured (from simpler to more complex and detailed). First, we chose a simple index that 
captures information quantity (quantity index). Second, given that most of the indices em-
ployed in the prior literature capture informational coverage, we designed an index (scope 
index) that refl ects coverage of specifi c topics. Third, we include in the analysis the multidi-
mensional index proposed by Beretta and Bozzolan (2005) (2), which is claimed to be a proxy 
for disclosure quality (named quality index). Moreover, each of the dimensions that make up 
the quality index is also considered in the analysis. In addition, we suggest that the previous 
contradictory results from research on disclosure determinants might be caused by the use 
of different disclosure measures. To evaluate this claim, we compare two indices that are 
similar in design; the scope index and the coverage dimension of the quality index. 
The coding process required the analysis of 108 annual reports in order to fi nd sentences 
with forward-looking information. These sentences were coded according to the criteria 
mentioned below for each index.
4.1.1. Quantity index
The quantity index (QNI) measures the amount of information by taking into account the 
number of sentences with forward-looking information. Its purpose is to capture disclosure 
quantity —which is standardised in order to make it relative to the sample— in accordance 
with the following formula: 
 QNIi = (fl i – min) / (Max – min) (1)
Where:
fl i: is number of sentences with forward-looking information disclosed by company i.
Max:  is maximum number of sentences with forward-looking information disclosed by a 
company across the sample.
min:  is minimum number of sentences with forward-looking information disclosed by a 
company across the sample.
The quantity index ranges between 0 and 1.
 (2) Beretta and Bozolan (2005) quality index robustness has been assessed by different methods in order to support its 
validity to capture disclosure quality. An updated version of the working paper (Beretta and Bozolan, 2005) has been publis-
hed recently (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Beretta et al., 2009).
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4.1.2. Scope index
The scope index (SCI) is a self-constructed index similar to many indices employed in the 
previous literature. Considering a given a list of items, the value of the index for a parti-
cular company is obtained by dividing the number of information items disclosed by that 
company by the total number of information disclosure items that might be disclosed. This 
index is composed of forward-looking information items which were selected by taking 
into account the guidance offered by professional bodies and the classifi cation scheme su-
ggested by Robb et al. (2001). We propose the following six categories of forward-looking 
information: environment (1), evolution (2), goals, strategies and business policies (3), in-
formation related to dividends policy (4), information about future investments (5), organi-
zation and corporate structure (6). 
A higher value is assigned to quantitative information (as in Botosan, 1997, among others). 
Quantitative information is more specifi c and seems to imply a greater responsibility, 
and hence an increase in reputational costs (Bhojraj, 1999). Furthermore, narrative in-
formation is more easily manipulated (Balata and Breton, 2005). The categories are not 
weighted, but the score of each item ranges from 0 points if there is no forward-looking 
information of that type, 0.5 points if the information provided is narrative and 1 point if 
the information is quantitative.
4.1.3. Quality index
The quality index is designed according to Beretta and Bozzolan (2005) and is claimed to 
capture quality of forward-looking information disclosed by companies. Although quality is 
an abstract concept and its measurement is complex, according to some authors (Beattie 
et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2005) it is possible to obtain a proxy for disclosure qua-
lity which appreciates different dimensions of measurement.
The quality index distinguishes between two dimensions that are measured by two diffe-
rent indices: the relative quantity index (RQT) and the richness index (RCN) (3). The fi nal 
value of the quality index (QLI) is obtained by taking the mean value of the two indices. 
 1
 QLI = —— (RQTi + RCNi) (2)
 2
The relative quantity index (RQT) is calculated as the difference between observed disclo-
sure for a company and estimated disclosure (estimated through standardized residuals of 
an OLS regression, using size and industry as independent variables). The richness index 
(RCN) is designed to capture disclosure quality, and is calculated by averaging two new 
dimensions associated to information richness: width (WID) and depth (DEP). 
 1
 RCNi = —— (WIDi + DEPi) (3)
 2
 (3) The design of this index is explained in detail in Beretta and Bozzolan (2005 & 2008).
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Width (WID) depends on both coverage (COV) of important topics and on disclosure dis-
persion (DIS) (which measures the concentration of the items disclosed). The value of the 
width index (WID) is obtained as the arithmetic mean of the coverage and dispersion di-
mensions.
 1 WIDi = —— (COVi + DISi) (4) 2
Coverage (COV) is calculated by dividing the topics disclosed at least once into the total 
number of topics considered, and dispersion (DIS) corresponds to the standardized En-
tropy index (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Forward-looking information disclosure is clas-
sifi ed by taking suggestions from the Jenkins report (AICPA, 1994) into account, and the 
following items are then chosen: strategy (1), corporate background, including fi nancial 
structure (2), corporate structure (3), organizational structure (4) and operations (5), and 
external environment, including political, economic, fi nancial and social items (6), environ-
mental topics (7), industry (8) and legal aspects (9).
 
1
 st
 COVi = ——Σ INFij (5)
 
st
 j = 1
 st
 –Σpij 1n pij
 j = 1 DISi = ———————— (6) 1n st
Where:
INFij:  has a value of 1 if the annual report of company i discloses forward-looking informa-
tion about subtopic j, and is 0 otherwise.
st: is the number of topics (9 topics).
pij:  is the amount of information disclosed in subtopic j (number of sentences) divided by 
the total disclosure of company i (the total number of sentences with forward-looking 
information).
The coverage dimension is built in a similar way to most of the indices used in the prior 
literature. Although this dimension looks quite similar to the scope index (SCI), they differ 
in the selection of categories, as well as in the treatment of quantitative information. For 
this reason, this measure was compared to the scope index to evaluate the infl uence that 
the use of different disclosure measures has on the results from research on disclosure 
determinants.
Depth (DEP) depends on the type of measure used in an information unit, on the communica-
tion of the economic sign of the disclosed items and on the information profi le. Depth is obtai-
ned averaging the economic sign and measure (ESM) and outlook profi le (OTL) indices.
 1 DEPi = —— (ESMi + OTLi) (7) 2
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The type of measure is captured by the MSR index, which is defi ned as the ratio between 
the number of phrases (forward-looking) containing a measure, and the total number of 
pieces of forward-looking information considered in the annual report. The expected im-
pact on future performance is measured by the economic sign index (ES), which counts the 
number of pieces of forward-looking information disclosed that contain an indication of the 
sign of effective or expected impact on actual or future performance of the item disclosed. 
This number is then calculated as the proportion of the total number of phrases (forward-
looking) considered in the annual report. The ESM index is calculated by aggregating the 
MSR and ES sub-indices.
 1 ESMi = —— (MSRi + ESi) (8) 2
The outlook profi le (OTL) attribute is calculated by aggregating two other dimensions. In-
formation nature is captured by the ACP index, which is calculated by dividing the number 
of sentences with forward-looking information on decisions, programs, and actions into 
the total number of sentences with forward-looking information. Information relevance 
is captured by the FL index, which considers sentences with forward-looking information 
that include information useful in the generation of earnings forecasts (FL). 
 1 OTLi = —— (ACPi + FLi) (9) 2
Consequently, the quality index is composed of several dimensions that are expected to be 
related to information quality. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We study the corporate characteristics that explain the decision of a company to disclose 
forward-looking information, by following previous disclosure research and in particular, 
by taking into account prior studies on forward-looking information disclosure as a refe-
rence point. A regression analysis is undertaken through an equation that relates each 
disclosure index (dependent variable) to several explanatory variables (independent va-
riables). Along the lines of previous studies, size, proprietary costs, profi tability, leverage, 
growth and foreign exchange listing are selected as corporate characteristics that may 
explain company incentives to disclose. Our aim is not to cover every factor considered in 
the prior literature, but to include in the model those factors that are most commonly asso-
ciated to disclosure theories. The defi nition of the explanatory variables is the following:
•  Size (SIZE): In spite of having been measured by different magnitudes (e.g.: total assets, ope-
rating revenues or market value), most of the studies fi nd that this variable is signifi cantly 
and positively associated with disclosure. As a proxy for size we use operating revenues.
•  Profi tability (ROE): Several variables have been employed in the previous literature to 
measure profi tability. In this research, we select return on equity (ROE). 
• Leverage (LEV): Leverage is calculated by dividing total debt by total assets. 
• Growth (OR_GROWTH): Growth in operating revenues is used as a proxy for growth. 
•  Foreign exchange listing (FE_LISTING): Due to the fact that most of the companies in 
the sample were listed in more than one foreign stock market, a dummy variable was 
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created with a value of 1 if the company was listed in the New York Stock Exchange 
and/or the London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. 
The general model used is:
DIi = α + β1SIZEi + β2 ROEi + β3 LEVi + β4 OR_GROWTHi + β5 FE_LISTINGi + ε
where DIi refers to forward-looking information disclosure, which is measured through 
the different indices (quality, scope, and quantity). The dimensions of the Quality index 
are also considered as disclosure measures. Attention is paid to some specifi c information 
attributes, such as coverage (designed is the same way as the disclosure indices that are 
employed in the previous literature) and the depth dimensions (which are directly related 
to information richness).
Since the dependent variable is measured through different indices, several regression mo-
dels are estimated. A multivariate analysis is performed, where 36 fi rms —in years 2002, 
2003 and 2004— are studied, which provides a panel data of 108 fi rm-year observations. 
The models are estimated for pooled data for three years (2002-2004) using intercept dum-
mies for individual years to capture fi xed effects (Greene, 1997: 621) thereby minimizing 
temporal effects. The results of each model are compared and their signifi cance analyzed.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics for disclosure indices and explanatory variables are shown in Ta-
ble 1. There are some differences in the values of the disclosure indices. The quality index 
(QLI) mean value is 0.47. On average, companies in the sample cover 64% and 55% of the 
information items included in the scope (SCI) index and the coverage (COV) dimension, 
respectively. The lowest mean value is obtained by the quantity index (QNI), at just 0.23. 
These divergences in descriptive statistics might give rise to differences when studying 
determinants of information disclosure. The values of the explanatory variables present a 
high dispersion. However, there are no outliers that infl uence further analysis.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DISCLOSURE INDICES AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
(108 FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS. YEARS 2002, 2003 & 2004)
Variables a Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Quantity index 0.23 0.19 0.00 1.00
Scope index 0.64 0.16 0.33 1.00
Quality index 0.47 0.10 0.24 0.83
Coverage dimension 0.55 0.14 0.22 0.89
SIZE 7,343.97 9,358.41 114.15 41,406
ROE 14.16 32.17 -249.22 74.41
LEV 73.47 16.51 20.25 97.00
(Continúa pág. sig.)
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Variables a Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
OR_GROWTH 13.76 57.07 -45.99 514.34
FE_LISTING 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
a The quantity index measures information amount taking into account the number of sentences with forward-looking information. 
The scope index is obtained by dividing the number of information items disclosed by a company by the total number of information 
disclosure items that might be disclosed (six forward-looking information items: environment (1), evolution (2), goals, strategies and 
business policies (3), information related to dividends policy (4), information about future investments (5), organization and corporate 
structure (6)). The quality index (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2005) is an aggregated index composed of two dimensions, relative quantity 
and richness. The relative quantity index (RQT) is calculated as the difference between observed disclosure for a company and estima-
ted disclosure. The richness index (RCN) is designed to capture disclosure quality, and is calculated by averaging two new dimensions 
associated to information richness: width (WID) and depth (DEP). Width (WID) depends on both coverage (COV) of important topics 
and on disclosure dispersion (DIS) (which measures concentration of items disclosed). Depth (DEP) depends on the type of measure 
used in an information unit, on the communication of the economic sign of the disclosed items and on information profi le.
SIZE is defi ned as operating revenues; ROE is return on equity; LEV is calculated dividing total debt between total assets; OR_
GROWTH is growth in operating revenues; FE_LISTING is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. Operating revenues are in millions of euros.
As an initial approach, Pearson correlations were calculated. Results are shown in Table 2 
and reveal the relationships between the disclosure indices and the explanatory variables 
included in the statistical model. The quantity index is correlated with all explanatory varia-
bles apart from ROE. Size is the variable that shows the highest correlation with the three 
disclosure indices and the coverage dimension. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of autoco-
rrelation problems since the coeffi cients are low and not signifi cant in many of the cases. 
The regression model was then estimated by capturing fi xed effects (Greene, 1997). Table 3 
contains results from the estimation of the model with four different dependent variables: the 
three disclosure indices (quality, scope and quantity) and the coverage dimension of the qua-
lity index. Table 4 shows the results obtained when the dimensions that compose the quality 
index are used as dependent variables. Application of the Belsley test (Belsley et al., 1980) 
revealed no problem of multicollinearity. Similarly, White’s test (White, 1980) proved that 
the homocedasticity assumption was not violated. Finally, the Durbin and Watson test con-
fi rmed that there was no autocorrelation (Durbin and Watson, 1950). The F-statistic shows 
the power of the independent variables to explain variation in the dependent variable. Since 
in most cases the signifi cance value of the F-statistic is small (lower than 0.05), we can state 
that independent variables do a good job in explaining variation in the dependent variable. 
Disclosure theories use the concept of disclosure in a generic way, as they usually predict 
that companies will increase the level of disclosure or have a better disclosure under exis-
tence of particular company conditions. However, theories usually fail to prescribe which 
specifi c information attributes will improve or what should be considered as better disclo-
sure. Therefore disclosure theories may not always be valid since disclosure behaviour of 
companies will vary depending on the information attribute considered. Some of the hypo-
theses of disclosure theories will be verifi ed when information disclosure is measured with 
an index defi ned in generic terms (such as quantity), but other different hypotheses will be 
verifi ed when the index captures information attributes of a more complex and detailed 
nature (such as information depth).
TABLE 1 (cont.)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DISCLOSURE INDICES AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
(108 FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS. YEARS 2002, 2003 & 2004)
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TABLE 3
MULTIVARIATE LINEAR REGRESSIONS (FIXED EFFECTS MODEL)
(108 fi rm-year observations. Years 2002, 2003 & 2004, t-statistics in parentheses)
DIi = α + β1SIZEi + β2 ROEi + β3 LEVi + β4 OR_GROWTHi + β5 FE_LISTINGi + ε
DEPENDENT VARIABLEA: DISCLOSURE INDEX (DI
I
)
Explanatory
Variablesb
Quantity index Scope index Quality index Coverage dimension
Intercept -0.011
(-0.206)
0.502***
(7.809)
0.407***
(9.858)
0.401***
(7.680)
SIZE 0.672***
(7.377)
0.347***
(3.037)
0.386***
(3.153)
0.581***
(5.315)
ROE 0.014
(0.197)
-0.075
(-0.852)
0.043
(0.459)
0.019
(0.231)
LEV 0.226***
(3.188)
0.117
(1.325)
0.108
(1.146)
0.158*
(1.873)
OR_GROWTH 0.166**
(2.295)
-0.009
(-0.105)
0.038
(0.395)
-0.070
(-0.814)
FE_LISTING -0.160*
(-1.756)
0.174
(0.904)
-0.166
(-1.364)
-0.113
(-1.035)
Adjusted R2 0.499 0.216 0.100 0.276
F (p-value) 16.082
(0.000)
5.200
(0.000)
2.074
(0.013)
9.172
(0.000)
a The quantity index measures information amount taking into account the number of sentences with forward-looking information. 
The scope index is obtained by dividing the number of information items disclosed by a company by the total number of information 
disclosure items that might be disclosed [six forward-looking information items: environment (1), evolution (2), goals, strategies 
and business policies (3), information related to dividends policy (4), information about future investments (5), organization and 
corporate structure (6)]. The quality index (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2005) is an aggregated index composed of two dimensions, relative 
quantity and richness. The relative quantity index (RQT) is calculated as the difference between observed disclosure for a company 
and estimated disclosure. The richness index (RCN) is designed to capture disclosure quality, and is calculated by averaging two 
new dimensions associated to information richness: width (WID) and depth (DEP). Width (WID) depends on both coverage (COV) of 
important topics and on disclosure dispersion (DIS) (which measures concentration of items disclosed). Depth (DEP) depends on the 
type of measure used in an information unit, on the communication of the economic sign of the disclosed items and on information 
profi le.
b SIZE is defi ned as operating revenues; ROE is return on equity; LEV is calculated dividing total debt between total assets; OR_
GROWTH is growth in operating revenues; FE_LISTING is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. Operating revenues are in millions of euros. 
* Signifi cant at 10% level; ** Signifi cant at 5% level; *** Signifi cant at 1% level.
The quantity index was defi ned in general terms, simply by capturing information quantity. 
When using the quantity index (QNI), results in Table 3 indicate that size, leverage, and 
growth are positively related to forward-looking information disclosure, at 1%, 1% and 
5%, respectively. Similar to the evidence found in previous studies, this result supports 
the hypothesis, suggested by agency, signalling, and political process theories, that lar-
ger fi rms have incentives to reveal more voluntary information. It also corroborates the 
agency theory prediction that highly-leveraged companies will provide more information. 
Finally, signifi cance of the growth variable confi rms the signalling theory hypothesis that 
companies with high growth rates have incentives to increase disclosure to convey that 
information to the market. 
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TABLE 4 
MULTIVARIATE LINEAR REGRESSIONS: QUALITY INDEX DIMENSIONS (FIXED EFFECTS MODEL)
(108 fi rm-year observations. Years 2002, 2003 & 2004, t-statistics in parentheses)
DIi = α + β1SIZEi + β2 ROEi + β3 LEVi + β4 OR_GROWTHi + β5 FE_LISTINGi + ε
DEPENDENT VARIABLEa: DISCLOSURE INDEX (DIi)
Explanatory 
Variablesb
Coverage 
(COV)
Dispersion 
(DIS)
Width (WID)
Economic 
Sign (ESM)
Outlook
Profi le (OTL)
Depth (DEP)
Intercept 0.401***
(7.680)
0.481***
(11.031)
0.441***
(9.946)
0.581***
(8.289)
0.790***
(13.086)
0.680***
(12.704)
SIZE 0.581***
(5.315)
0.542***
(4.710)
0.605***
(5.449)
0.006
(0.050)
-0.010
(-0.083)
-0.002
(-0.014)
ROE 0.019
(0.231)
0.132
(1.488)
0.074
(0.871)
0.125
(1.265)
0.095
(1.016)
0.134
(1.394)
LEV 0.158*
(1.873)
0.107
(1.206)
0.145*
(1.700)
-0.020
(-0.205)
-0.127
(-1.360)
-0.079
(-0.820)
OR_GROWTH -0.070
(-0.814)
-0.073
(-0.800)
-0.076
(-0.870)
-0.125
(-1.228)
-0.310***
(-3.243)
-0.260**
(-2.639)
FE_LISTING -0.113
(-1.035)
-0.380***
(-3.303)
-0.248**
(-2.234)
0.118
(0.915)
-0.140
(-1.052)
-0.004
(-0.032)
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.198 0.253 -0.003 0.107 0.052
F (p-value) 9.172
(0.000)
6.278
(0.000)
8.244
(0.000)
0.933
(0.463)
3.565
(0.005)
2.175
(0.063)
a The dependent variables in the different models are the dimensions that compose the quality index of Beretta and Bozzolan (2005). 
The quality index is an aggregated index composed of two dimensions, relative quantity and richness. The relative quantity index 
is calculated as the difference between observed disclosure for a company and estimated disclosure. The richness index (RCN) 
is designed to capture disclosure quality, and is calculated by averaging two new dimensions associated to information richness: 
width (WID) and depth (DEP). Width (WID) depends on both coverage (COV) of important topics and on disclosure dispersion (DIS) 
(which measures concentration of items disclosed). Depth (DEP) depends on the type of measure used in an information unit and 
on the communication of the economic sign of the disclosed items (EMS index) and on information profi le (OTL). The ESM index 
is calculated by aggregating the MSR and ES sub-indices. The MSR index captures the type of measure, which is defi ned as the 
ratio between the number of phrases (forward-looking) containing a measure and the total number of pieces of forward-looking 
information considered in the annual report. The expected impact on future performance is measured by the economic sign index 
(ES), which counts the number of pieces of forward-looking information disclosed containing an indication of the sign of effective 
or expected impact on actual or future performance of the item disclosed out of the total number of phrases (forward-looking) 
considered in the annual report. The outlook profi le (OTL) attribute is calculated by aggregating two other dimensions. Information 
nature is captured by the ACP index, which is calculated dividing the number of sentences with forward-looking information on 
decisions, programs, and actions into the total number of sentences with forward-looking information. Information relevance is 
captured by the FL index, which considers sentences with forward looking information that include information useful to make 
earnings forecasts (FL).
b SIZE is defi ned as operating revenues; ROE is return on equity; LEV is calculated dividing total debt between total assets; OR_
GROWTH is growth in operating revenues; FE_LISTING is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. Operating revenues are in millions of euros. .
* Signifi cant at 10% level; ** Signifi cant at 5% level; *** Signifi cant at 1% level.
When the scope (SCI) index or the coverage (COV) dimension is used as the dependent va-
riable, determinants of forward-looking information disclosure differ, since only size (and 
leverage for the coverage dimension) appears as signifi cant. When disclosure is measured 
in terms of scope/coverage, disclosure theories are supported but only insofar as the hypo-
theses that refer to size and leverage. 
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When the dependent variable in the regression model is the quality index (QLI), size 
appears as the only determinant of an increase in disclosure quality. Moreover, the R2s va-
lues indicate that the model explains almost 50% of quantity, but just 10% of quality, which 
shows again that some of the theoretical predictions on disclosure determinants are not 
confi rmed when specifi c information attributes are considered. 
Nevertheless, the quality index was designed as composed of several disclosure dimensions 
that capture specifi c information attributes. The company characteristics that determine 
an increase in disclosure quality differ depending on the information attribute considered. 
The results of the estimation of the regression model by considering each of the quality 
index dimensions as the dependent variable are shown in Table 4. 
Some of the results for the dimensions that form the quality index are inconsistent with 
disclosure theories, making it necessary to bear in mind that those theories refer to the 
total disclosure for a company, and not to specifi c disclosure attributes. The width (WID) 
dimension and its components —coverage (COV) and dispersion (DIS)— show, as expec-
ted according to disclosure theories, a positive relationship with size. This coeffi cient is 
signifi cant at 1% for all these dimensions. However, the specifi c dimensions that capture 
information profi le, which are closely associated to information richness, show unexpected 
results. The coeffi cient on size is not signifi cant when disclosure is measured through the 
depth (DEP) indices, including the economic sign (ESM) and outlook profi le (OTL) dimen-
sions. This fi nding contradicts the disclosure theories that support a positive association 
between size and disclosure. Larger companies disclose information of a higher quality 
in terms of coverage and dispersion, but fail to provide more information about plans, 
decisions or actions that will affect the future development of the company or information 
that is useful to make forecasts. This supports our hypothesis that when more detailed 
attributes of the information are considered, then the existing disclosure theories may be 
rendered invalid. 
When the components of the width dimension are considered, it is found that foreign ex-
change listing holds a negative relationship with forward-looking information disclosure 
when it is measured with the dispersion and width indices. A possible explanation is the 
design of this variable, which implies that only a few companies are assigned a value of 1.
Regarding the components of the depth dimension, operating revenue growth shows a ne-
gative association with forward-looking information disclosure (outlook profi le (OTL) and 
depth (DEP) dimensions). The coeffi cient of the depth index is negative (-0.260) and signifi -
cant at 5%. This is consistent with some theoretical arguments which claim that companies 
with high growth rates might be reluctant to provide voluntary information to prevent 
competitive disadvantages (Prencipe, 2004). However, this result is unexpected according 
to signalling theory, since it indicates that companies with higher growth rates provide less 
information of a forward-looking nature about plans, decisions, actions and less informa-
tion that may be useful for forecasting purposes. The depth dimension is designed in terms 
of information richness, without considering information quantity or coverage. The results 
obtained for this measure contradict theoretical predictions, since the depth index and its 
components are not much explained by the selected characteristics. Different information 
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attributes are explained by different determinants, as it was expected. As a consequence, 
different disclosure attributes must be explained with different theories.
The second objective was to examine how disclosure measure design infl uences the results 
obtained from research on disclosure determinants. To this end, two indices that measure 
disclosure in terms of coverage, which both pay attention to the number of topics disclosed 
for a given company, are compared. The two indices are the scope (SCI) index and the co-
verage dimension (COV) of the quality index, which are designed in a similar fashion. 
The results of the estimation of the regression model with each of these two indices as the 
dependent variable are shown in Table 3. The determinants of coverage are not the same 
as the determinants of scope, since when measuring forward-looking information disclo-
sure through coverage (COV), then size and leverage seem to be related to disclosure, but 
when it is measured with the scope index (SCI), then only size appears as signifi cant. Mo-
reover, the coeffi cient on size differs (0.347 when the dependent variable is the scope index 
and 0.581 if the coverage dimension is used). Therefore, even though similar indices are 
used (the coverage and the scope indices), results differ, which in turn indicates the impact 
that the choice of a particular disclosure measure has on this type of study.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research on the determinants of disclosure has so far failed to provide conclusive results. 
The complexity underlying disclosure measures may explain the confl icting evidence. Dis-
closure indices that capture diverse information attributes and have different designs co-
exist in this literature. We study whether the determinants of a specifi c information attri-
bute differ from those that determine the disclosure of another information attribute. This 
being the case, disclosure theories will not unfailingly hold true, as they characterize dis-
closure in general terms, without making a clear distinction between specifi c information 
attributes. Moreover, we also explore the infl uence of disclosure index design on the results 
of the research on disclosure determinants. If different designs of measures that capture 
the same information attribute cause differences in determinants, then the evidence will 
highlight the need to search for measures of a more comparable nature. 
An empirical analysis of forward-looking information disclosure determinants for a sample 
of listed Spanish companies was performed. Several disclosure indices, which measure 
disclosure of different information attributes (such as quantity, coverage and quality), were 
compared. In addition, we also compared two indices that capture the same information 
attribute (coverage, since this is the most commonly measured information attribute in 
existing literature) but which are different in design. 
Our results show that size is the only determinant that is always signifi cant, no matter 
which disclosure attribute is being analysed. However the determinants of information 
attributes of a more specifi c nature are different to those that infl uence attributes of a 
less specifi c nature. Size, leverage and growth determine information quantity. However, 
when disclosure is characterized in terms of quality, size is the only variable that explains 
disclosure. In addition, if attention is paid to the quality index components, no variable 
appears as a determinant of disclosure for the depth dimension, which is the dimension 
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that captures information richness. Companies perceive higher costs when providing more 
detailed information, and the reasons for disclosing information attributes that are more 
related to information richness differ from those that infl uence the disclosure of generic 
information attributes. Consequently, general disclosure theories fail to hold true for all the 
information attributes. 
Since the determinants of disclosure of some information attributes do not coincide with 
the determinants of another attributes, disclosure theories should therefore pay specifi c 
attention to the information attribute that is being measured. Our results help to clarify 
why prior evidence appears to be contradictory and to refi ne theoretical arguments on the 
reasons behind disclosure decisions. Disclosure indices should clearly defi ne the informa-
tion attribute that is captured, as it will infl uence the results obtained.
Furthermore, regardless of the information attribute that is measured, disclosure mea-
sure design infl uences results as well. Our empirical evidence indicates that results differ 
when two indices that capture the same information attribute, but that are different in 
design, are used. Empirical results are conditional upon the measure used. Therefore, 
care must be taken when comparing the results from disclosure studies that employ di-
fferent measures of the same attribute. In terms of the implications for future research, 
our results highlight the need to search for a consensus on index design that would help 
towards comparability and enable results of a more conclusive nature to be attained. 
Another future development could be the study of the impact of using different disclosure 
indices on the effects of disclosures, such as cost of capital, analysts’ forecasts and stock 
returns.
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Disclosure theories and disclosure 
measures (by F. Bravo Urquiza, M. C. Abad 
Navarro and M. Trombetta)
Juan Manuel García Lara. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
1. WHAT IS DISCLOSURE QUALITY?
In the presence of information asymmetries, potential investors cannot properly eva-
luate the expected profi tability and risk of the available investment opportunities. Firms 
provide information to reduce the adverse effects of these information asymmetries (in-
effi cient pricing and adverse selection problems, as described by Akerlof, 1970). This 
provision of information from fi rms to the potential providers of capital funds is done 
through the fi nancial statements and also through other communication channels. An 
impressive amount of literature has analysed how the information reported compulsorily 
in the fi nancial statements should be to reduce the problems created by information as-
ymmetries. One example of this literature is the large stream of studies about whether 
accounting numbers should be more or less conservative (LaFond & Watts, 2008, García 
Lara, García Osma & Penalva, 2011). Similarly, there are many studies analysing whe-
ther and how voluntary disclosure contributes to reduce adverse selection problems. A 
recent example of this voluntary disclosure literature is Francis, Nanda & Olsson (2008), 
who study whether voluntary disclosure contributes to decrease cost of capital. An in-
creased cost of capital is one of the clearest examples of the deadweight losses introdu-
ced by information asymmetries.
Even if the problems of adverse selection are resolved through the ex-ante provision of 
information, there is still an unresolved issue. Once that investors allocate their funds to 
the fi rms, current investors will require information about fi rm’s activities to avoid being 
expropriated by the managerial team or the dominating shareholder. Consequently, be-
sides the role of (accounting) information to resolve problems related to the allocation of 
resources in the economic system, accounting information plays also a role in resolving 
agency confl icts between the different parties in the fi rm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
provision of information to monitor managerial decisions can also be done through the fi -
nancial statements, and also through other voluntary channels. Prior accounting research 
has analysed which should be the desirable characteristics of the information included in 
the fi nancial statements to permit a better monitoring over managers’ decisions. Recent 
examples of this literature include García Lara, García Osma & Penalva (2009) or Biddle, 
Hilary & Verdi (2009). Regarding disclosure, there is also a large stream of research stu-
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dying the role of disclosure to reduce agency costs. For a recent example, see Hope & 
Thomas (2008).
Healy and Palepu (2001) describe in more detail these two roles of voluntary disclosure 
to decrease adverse selection and agency problems. Given these two roles, I believe that, 
from a theoretical viewpoint, voluntary disclosure could be labeled as being of high quality 
when it contributes to reduce adverse selection problems and agency costs. One related 
issue to consider as well is that, in certain scenarios, disclosure of information that reduces 
agency costs might not be optimal. These scenarios are basically two: a) if disclosure in-
creases proprietary costs beyond the reduction in agency costs (1), and b) if disclosure leads 
to excess monitoring and this excess monitoring drives managers into taking ineffi cient 
operating decisions that decrease fi rm value beyond the reduction in agency costs (Herma-
lin & Weisbach, 2009).
2. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF DISCLOSURE QUALITY
Measuring the quality of disclosure is a diffi cult task, and most of the empirical research on 
voluntary disclosure has used measures that are closer to quantity rather than to quality. 
A good example is the study of Francis et al. (2008). They analyse whether voluntary dis-
closure reduces cost of capital. Once they control for earnings quality they fail to fi nd any 
relation between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. They measure disclosure using 
an index that they create analysing whether the fi rm discloses 25 items of information. 
They assign a value of 1 or 0 for each item of information disclosed or not disclosed. For 
example, they analyse whether the fi rm provides a forecast of sales. If the fi rm provides 
the forecast, they add 1 point to the index. They do the same with other 24 information 
items including forecasts of cash fl ows, forecasts of profi ts, number of employees, etc… 
The issue with their index is that it captures disclosure quantity, and not disclosure quality. 
That is, we cannot know whether the sales forecast is really contributing to decrease in-
formation asymmetries, as it may even introduce additional noise if it is not refl ecting the 
true expectations. This is so because an opportunistic manager can use forecasts to create 
false expectations about future outcomes. Given that their index captures quantity, and it 
is not clear that it captures quality, the link between their proxy and cost of capital is not 
clear either, and this could partly explain why they fail to fi nd a relation between voluntary 
disclosure and cost of capital. 
Several studies have proposed different ways of disentangling disclosure quantity from 
disclosure quality. One valuable example is Li (2010). In her study on how product market 
competition impacts voluntary disclosure, she uses the accuracy of the management fore-
casts of earnings and capital expenditures as a proxy for the quality of voluntary disclosure 
of forward looking information. More accurate forecasts of earnings and capital expendi-
tures are expected to decrease information asymmetries between managers and current 
and potential shareholders, thus contributing to reduce adverse selection problems and 
to improve the monitoring over managers. Therefore, to contribute to improve disclosure 
 (1) There is an extensive literature on the proprietary costs of disclosure. See, for example, Wagenhofer (1990).
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quality it is not only necessary that the fi rm provides a forecast, but also that the forecast 
is accurate. 
Another example is Blanco, García Lara & Tribó (2010). They study whether improved 
voluntary segment disclosure contributes to decrease cost of capital. Contrary to Francis 
et al. (2008) they fi nd that improved segment disclosure contributes to decrease cost of 
capital beyond the decrease due to improved earnings quality. As a proxy for the quality of 
segment disclosures they use the residuals of a model where they explain the quantity of 
segment disclosures on business and geographic diversifi cation, information asymmetries 
and controls. Firms providing more details than expected about their segments (larger 
residuals) are expected to contribute more to reduce information asymmetries, and are 
expected to facilitate the estimation of future cash fl ows. Consequently, they interpret the 
residuals of the regression as a proxy for disclosure quality. They further fi nd that the 
segment disclosure quantity is just a proxy for fi rm diversifi cation, and consequently, that 
fi rms with a larger quantity of segment disclosures are not necessarily those facing less 
information asymmetries.
CONCLUSIONS
An important part of the research questions in the empirical disclosure literature link dis-
closure quality, not disclosure quantity, to some economic outcomes (profi tability, access 
to and cost of capital funds, corporate governance, etc...). Both Li (2010) and Blanco et al. 
(2010) fi nd ways to ascertain whether the information disclosed contributes to improve 
the information environment of the fi rm. That is, they successfully disentangle disclosure 
quality from disclosure quantity. I believe this should be the way forward in this stream of 
literature, and that researchers should struggle to fi nd their own ad-hoc ways to disentan-
gle disclosure quality from disclosure quantity in their research settings.
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